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Abstract
This research was motivated by the increase in the number of Internet based
trucking exchanges that have come into existence during 2000. This thesis categorizes
currently operating transportation exchanges according to their price setting mechanism
and strategies.
A trucking exchange for truckload carriers with a carrier-centric price setting
mechanism is considered in this thesis. A game theoretic model is formulated to represent
the analytical basis of carriers' bidding strategies in the exchange. Carriers bid based on
their costs and perceptions about their competitors' bidding strategies. Through
consecutive auctions of similar loads, carriers update their perceptions about their
competitors' bidding strategies.
Single round sealed bid auctions with first price mechanism, button auctions, and
a monopoly situation are simulated to represent successive bidding by carriers for similar
loads. A theoretical basis for identifying carriers' optimal bidding strategies in each
auction is suggested. Their equilibrium bids are observed. Further, the participating
carriers' aggregate profits in each auction quantify the auction efficiencies for shippers
and carriers.
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
Exchanges are marketplaces where people and businesses trade goods, based on
negotiations. An example is a stock exchange, several 'of which were founded in
countries around the world during the last few hundred years to formalize trading of
shares of companies - the New York Stock Exchange, for example, was founded in 1792
(http://www.nyse.com). Exchanges adopt certain mechanisms/rules to facilitate smooth
and efficient transfer of goods and services between individuals. This research studies
exchange mechanisms for the trucking industry, where instead of individuals the entities
participating in the marketplace are companies buying and selling motor carrier services.
Section 1.1 discusses fundamental concepts of the trucking industry. Section 1.2
describes the various mechanisms through which trucking services are procured. Section
1.3 summarizes the research objectives, followed by an outline of this thesis.
1.1 Trucking Industry Fundamentals
This section introduces the primary players in the trucking industry along with
their specific functions. Then, types of trucking operations are described, followed by a
description of the current structure of the trucking industry emphasizing its importance in
the US economy. Lastly, economic considerations that govern the operations of trucking
companies are discussed. Examples are included wherever deemed necessary, to clarify
the terminology and concepts.
1.1.1 Shippers and Carriers
Shippers and Carriers are the primary players in the trucking industry.
Shippers are companies that procure transportation to meet their business needs,
including retailers such as Wal-Mart, manufacturers such as Procter & Gamble, and
distributors such as Arrow Electronics. Wal-Mart Stores', Inc., for example, the largest
retailer in the world, buys over $1 Billion in motor carrier services in the US alone each
year. The Procter & Gamble2 (P&G) Company manufactures fabric and home care, baby
Source: http://www.walmart.con (2000)
2 Source: http://www.piz.com (2000)
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care, feminine care, tissues and towels, beauty care, health care, and food and beverage
products. It also buys over $1 Billion of motor carrier services in the US alone each year.
Arrow Electronics 3, Inc., the world's largest distributor of electronic components and
computer products, also buys over $1 Billion of transportation services each year.
Carriers are companies that provide transportation services to shippers. They
maintain their own fleets and equipment. Examples of carriers include J.B. Hunt and
Yellow Freight. J.B. Hunt Transport Services4 , Inc. for example, a truckload carrier (see
definition later) with annual revenues of over $2 Billion operates over 9,400 trucks, and
38,000 trailers and containers. Yellow Freight 5 is a less-than-truckload carrier (see
definition later) with annual revenues nearing $3 Billion.
1.1.2 Third party logistics companies and Brokers
In addition to shippers and carriers, important participants in the trucking
marketplace are intermediaries including third party logistics (3PL) companies and
various brokers.
3PLs manage the logistics, and within it the transportation function on behalf of
shippers. The services offered by 3PLs to shippers include transportation, warehousing
and inventory management, shipment consolidation, customs brokerage/documentation,
freight forwarding, management of logistics' information systems, carrier selection, rate
negotiation, product returns, fleet management (for shippers maintaining their own
private fleets), re-labeling/repackaging, order fulfillment, product assembly/installation,
inventory replenishment, order processing, management of customer spare parts, and so
6
on . To carriers, 3PLs act as customers (shippers) procuring transportation, in turn to
serve the end shippers.
3 Source: http://www.arrow.com (2000)
4 Source: http://www.ibhunt.con (2000)
5 Source: http://www.vellowfreight.com (2000)
6 Third-Party Logistics grows up, Cooke, J.A., Logistics Management and Distribution Report Online,
November 1998
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Based on net logistics revenue for 1999, Ryder Integrated Logistics was the
largest 3PL with $1.3 Billion/year, followed by Penske Logistics with $959 million7. All
three companies are 3PLs, but maintain their own fleet and equipment in addition to
relying on other transportation companies to provide transportation and other services to
the shippers.
In order to differentiate themselves from their competitors, transportation
companies have also started providing services similar to those provided by 3PLs.
Schneider Logistics8 , for example, with annual revenues at $1 Billion/year, grew out of
its parent trucking company. J.B. Hunt's logistics arm, which in 2000 merged into
Transplace.com, provided integrated transportation and logistics solutions to its
customers4 . Yellow Freight's value added services continue to provide its customers with
several services typically offered by 3PLs5 .
Some 3PLs rely solely on other transportation companies for the services they
offer to the shippers. An example is Fritz9 Companies, an international forwarder 0
offering transportation services but having no transportation assets.
Transportation brokers primarily match available capacity of carriers with
shippers' demand for transportation, apart from offering other services such as payment
and credit management. They receive information from carriers about their empty
trucks/capacity at various locations, and they receive requests from shippers for
transportation of loads that need to be moved between locations. They then match the
shippers with the appropriate carriers. An example is C.H. Robinson", a multi-billion
dollar broker. Apart from matching availability with demand for truck capacity, brokers
may take into account other factors such as prices, level of service, etc. in the criteria for
matching shippers with carriers. Section 1.2.2 discusses the evolution of the mechanism
7 3PLs: Riding the Wave, Cooke, J.A., Logistics Management and Distribution Report Online, July 2000
8 Source: http://www.schneider.com (2000)
9 Source: http://www.fritz.com (2000)
10 A forwarder is an agent who performs services such as receiving, transshipping, or delivering, to move
goods to their destination
"1 Source: http://www.chrobinson.com (2000)
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through which brokers facilitate contacts and subsequent negotiations between shippers
and carriers.
1.1.3 Truckload versus Less-than-truckload Operations
The cost of operating a truck is almost independent of its load. Thus, all else
being equal, it costs less per unit of freight, to haul full truckloads than it costs to haul
less than truckloads. If a shipper has enough freight from a given origin to a given
destination on a given day to fill a truck, the carrier would haul the shipment directly
using a single vehicle. This type of carrier operation: taking a full truck directly from a
shipper's origin to a destination is known as a truckload (TL) operation and the carriers
are called TL carriers. TL operations have irregular routes and unscheduled operations.
In cases when it is too expensive to use a direct service, in other words when the
shipment is too small to justify a dedicated conveyance for the trip, shipping is based on
consolidation. Consolidation involves a network of freight processing centers. Shipments
from multiple origins are loaded into a truck heading to a terminal located in the general
direction of the destinations of these shipments. In the terminal the shipments are
unloaded, sorted, combined with shipments from other origins, and re-loaded onto trucks
heading to a more specific set of destinations. This process may repeat several times and
thus a shipment may be sorted in several terminals on its path from the origin to its
destination. This type of carrier operation: taking shipments from a shipper's origin to a
destination through consolidation processes is known as a less-than-truckload (LTL)
operation and the carriers providing such services are called LTL carriers. LTL
operations have regular routes and schedules.
1.1.4 Industry Structure
In 1997, $503 Billion was spent on freight transportation in the US 13 . Figure 1.1
describes the distribution of freight expenditures among transportation modes. Trucking
is the dominant mode and accounts for nearly 80% of all transportation spending.
12 Some of the explanations in this section have been adapted from draft chapters of the book by Sheffi Y.,
Logistics Systems Analysis (1998)
13 National Transportation Statistics (1997), US Department of Transportation
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Figure 1.1 US Transportation Expenditures (1997)
Figure 1.2 provides segmentation by type and number of firms for the motor
carrier industry 4 . The TL sector is the most fragmented with approximately 50,000
firms. The four largest TL carriers account for just 12% of the revenues for the sector.
The LTL sector is more concentrated with the four largest carriers accounting for 57% of
total revenues for the sector. The next largest transportation mode, rail, is highly
concentrated with the four largest rail carriers accounting for 99% of industry revenues.
According to Goldman Sachs, in 2004, the amount of freight transportation sales
that originate on the Internet will reach $40.5 billion15 . The presumption of many
industry analysts is that a large portion of these sales will be initiated on business-to-
business transportation marketplaces that represent transactions between many buyers
" Standard & Poors (1998)
15 B2B: 2B or Not 2B?, Goldman Sachs Investment Research, Goldman Sachs (November 12, 1999)
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US Transportation Expenditures
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set of services.
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Figure 1.2 Trucking Industry Structure (1997)
Note: Revenue Classification: Class I, greater than $10 million; Class II, $3-$10 million;
Class III, less than $3 million
1.1.5 Transportation Cost Components
Transportation is fundamentally different from goods and other services that are
traded between buyers and sellers. Transportation is defined by what is shipped, when it
is shipped, where it is shipped (origin and destination of the shipment), and how it is
shipped. These aspects are tied into three economic factors that influence carriers' costs:
economies of scale, scope, and density. Among them economies of scope exist in TL
operations, and is relevant to this thesis. Economies of scale and density exist in LTL
operations, and are not discussed.
Economies of scope are present when the cost of serving a set of lanes by a single
carrier are lower than the cost of serving the same set by multiple carriers, where each
carrier serves a subset of lanes. This effect is strong for TL carriers but it is also
significant for LTL carriers. In both cases, the additional lanes for a carrier mitigate the
12
costs of repositioning vehicles and crews. As described in the following paragraphs, the
effect of economies of scope on TL carriers' costs is quantified by "location costs" in this
thesis.
The primary components of a carrier's cost in moviig a load include operational
costs and location costs.
Operational costs: A carrier incurs direct costs in transporting loads, including fuel costs,
drivers' wages, maintenance costs, overhead expenses, and so on. Some of the carrier's
costs are variable costs that are directly associated with transporting a load, and some are
fixed costs that need to be allocated over all loads. The operational cost to a carrier for
moving a certain load is the sum of the variable costs and the allocated fixed costs
associated with the load. Every carrier also charges a markup on every load to contribute
to its profits.
Location costs: A carrier provides transportation services over a network of locations.
Apart from operational costs for transporting loads, a carrier may incur costs in
repositioning its trucks from the destination location of a load to another location for its
follow-on utilization. Alternatively, it may incur costs due to the time that the truck may
need to stay idle at the destination location of a load before being utilized further. These
factors are considered by the carrier in computing location costs for each location in its
network. Thus, a location cost indicates the relative attractiveness of a location with
regard to its expected potential in generating profits for the carrier in the future. Location
costs are computed on the basis of historical data. Expected equipment availability at a
location, expected demands for transporting loads to all possible destinations out of the
16location, and the corresponding revenues, are used to compute its location cost .
Location costs change as the demands and equipment availabilities at different locations
in the carrier's network change. The difference in the location costs of the origin and
destination locations of a load indicates the "strategic cost" to the carrier in transporting
the load.
16 Maximizing Profits for North American Van Lines' Truckload Division: A New Framework for Pricing
and Operations, Powell, W.B., Sheffi, Y., Nickerson, K.S., Butterbaugh, K., Atherton, S., Interfaces 18,
January - February 1988
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1.2 Mechanisms of Logistics Services Procurement
Shippers and carriers negotiate long term contracts (typically 12-18 months)
based on their expected transportation requirements and truck availability, respectively.
Mostly, they agree on a flat rate on individual or packages of lanes for the entire duration
of a contract. Large shippers commit most of their forecast loads to carriers at the time of
negotiating contractual agreements due to their belief that these carriers will offer them
the lowest prices on the assigned lanes at all times and have equipment available for them
whenever needed, in addition to satisfactory levels of service. Thus, they participate in
spot markets to procure transportation only for their unexpected daily loads. For small
shippers, procuring transportation through contracts often proves to be more expensive
than doing it through spot markets. Thus they participate in spot markets to procure
transportation at lower rates. TL carriers participate in spot markets to procure loads to
achieve higher equipment utilization and minimize their repositioning costs. This section
describes the evolution of the mechanism through which shippers and carriers negotiate
to match their daily demands and available capacities in spot markets.
Until the recent proliferation of advanced telecommunications equipment, bulletin
boards at truck stops were the primary points of contact between shippers and carriers. A
truck intending to procure loads looked up bulletin boards at truck stops on its way for
available loads at convenient locations. Shippers who were in need of trucks, posted their
requirements on bulletin boards at nearby truck stops. Thus, shippers and carriers having
complementary requirements came into contact with each other through the bulletin
boards, most of which were managed by brokers. At the same time, carriers could also
inform appropriate brokers directly about available capacity on trucks passing through
different locations, and shippers could inform them about their transportation
requirements. Brokers matched shippers' loads with carriers' truck capacities based on
the information that they received from them, and additional information from postings at
the truck stops. In cases where shippers would post prices along with their loads,
negotiations between them and the carriers taking their loads would not be necessary. In
other cases, shippers and carriers coming into contact with each other directly through the
bulletin boards would further negotiate the terms of transportation. In cases when contact
would be intermediated by brokers, the broker could help them negotiate with each other.
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The Internet has enabled faster and more efficient communication between
shippers, carriers, and brokers. Bulletin boards at truck stops have manifested themselves
on the Internet in the form of web sites designed as digital bulletin boards. Digital
bulletin boards enable shippers to post their transportation requirements, carriers to post
their available truck capacities, and brokers to post their customers' requirements.
Further, they allow shippers, carriers, and brokers to find appropriate matches between
their requirements and the listings using automatic search capabilities. DAT Services 17 is
an example of a company that provides digital bulletin board services to shippers,
18
carriers, and brokers. The company grew out of Jubitz Truck Stop , a company that has
load monitors and call-boards at 1100 truck stops nationwide.
During 2000, Internet-based transportation exchanges in the form of web sites,
have emerged. These exchanges bring shippers, carriers, and intermediaries in contact
with each other. Further, they enable them to post and edit the terms of transportation for
loads, such as price. (In the rest of this thesis, intermediaries will be regarded as shippers
or carriers depending on whether they are servicing a shipper or a carrier, and will not be
mentioned explicitly.) Internet-based transportation exchanges can be categorized
according to their price-setting mechanisms.
Carrier-centric price setting mechanism exists in exchanges where carriers bid
the price at which loads are to be transported, and shippers choose from among the
bidding carriers. In anticipation, carriers may also post their available capacities at
different locations in their network along with desirable prices, and shippers may choose
from among them to fulfill their transportation requirements.
Shipper-centric price setting mechanism exists in exchanges where shippers bid
the desirable prices, which they are willing to pay to transport the loads, and carriers
choose from among the shippers' posted loads. In anticipation, carriers may also post
their available capacities at different locations, and shippers may bid to procure
transportation from among them.
Some currently operating transportation exchanges are discussed in Section 2.1.
17 Source: http://www.dat.com/ (2000)
18 Source: http://www.iubitztruckstop.com/iubitztruckstop/ (2000)
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1.3 Research Objectives
Shippers and carriers participate in trucking exchanges on the Internet in real-
time. In this thesis, trucking exchanges with a carrier-centric price setting mechanism are
considered. At the time a shipper needs to procure transportation for its unexpected daily
loads, it requests bids on a trucking exchange. Carriers bid on the shipper's loads, and the
shipper chooses the winning carriers to transport its loads. In this thesis, it is assumed that
shippers will use software programs to post their loads in transportation exchanges as
they become available, and carriers will use software programs to bid on them, based on
their current costs. This section summarizes the objectives of this thesis.
1.3.1 Carriers' Best Response Bidding Strategy
At any time, a carrier has its trucks at different locations in its network, some
moving loads, some moving empty to locations in expectation of follow-on loads, and
some idle waiting for follow-on loads. When a shipper requests bids to procure
transportation for its loads, each carrier bids based on its expected operational costs for
transporting the loads, its location costs of the origin and destination locations of the
loads, and its perception of the competing carriers' bidding strategies. Higher bid values
reduce the chances of a carrier's winning the load, but increase its profit if it does.
Conversely, lower bid values increase the chances of a carrier's winning the load, but
reduce its profit if it does. Thus, a carrier's bid value for each load includes a trade-off
between its chances of winning the load, and its profit if it does. This thesis aims at
recommending bidding strategies for carriers that maximize their expected profits in the
auction process. Such bidding strategies are referred to as "best response" bidding
strategies in game theory and are further explained in section 3.2.2.
1.3.2 Equilibrium Bidding Strategies for Carriers
When a shipper requests bids to procure transportation for its loads, several
carriers willing to transport the loads bid for it. Each of the carriers bid according to some
strategy. When each of the carriers bid rationally, they bid according to their best
response bidding strategy mentioned in section 1.3.1. Bid values based on the best
response bidding strategy depend on a carrier's expected operational costs for
transporting the loads, its location costs for the origin and destination locations of the
16
loads, and its beliefs about its competitors' bidding strategies. At equilibrium, no carrier
can increase its expected profits in the auction by changing its bid values unilaterally.
Best response bidding strategies for carriers that enable the existence of an equilibrium
condition, are referred to as equilibrium bidding strategies, and the corresponding bid
values are referred to as equilibrium bids. Section 3.2.3 further explains equilibrium
bidding strategies for carriers.
1.3.3 Carrier and Shipper Efficiencies for Different Auction Designs
A shipper may auction its loads according to several auction designs. The
auctions considered in this thesis are single round sealed bid auctions and button
auctions19 , for a single load. For each type of auction, there may be several sets of
equilibrium bidding strategies for carriers. Among the several sets of equilibrium bidding
strategies, one (or those) whose corresponding equilibrium maximizes carriers' aggregate
profits, is referred to as the efficient equilibrium bidding strategy (or strategies) for
carriers.
The winning carrier's bid value corresponding to the carriers' efficient
equilibrium bidding strategies in the auction of a load indicates the shipper's cost of
transporting the load according to that auction design. Among different possible types of
auctions, one that minimizes the shipper's cost of transporting its load is referred to as the
efficient auction type for the shipper.
This thesis identifies carriers' efficient equilibrium bidding strategies for different
types of auctions, and efficient auction types for shippers.
1.4 Outline of Thesis
This thesis is organized into four chapters. Chapter 2 describes exchange
mechanisms and their economic characteristics. Chapter 3 states the problem addressed in
this thesis, and discusses the research methodology adopted. Chapter 4 discusses results
from experiments performed to illustrate the research methodology, and summarizes this
thesis stating its contributions and directions of further work.
19 The various dimensions of auction design are further explained in section 2.2
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CHAPTER 2 ExCHANGE MECHANISMS
A transportation exchange can facilitate negotiations between shippers and
carriers according to different auction designs. Section '2.1 describes some of the
currently operating Internet-based transportation exchanges. Section 2.2 differentiates
among various dimensions of auctions. Section 2.3 outlines the economic characteristics
of a trucking exchange, and the last section summarizes.
2.1 Operating Transportation Exchanges
This section categorizes some of the currently operating transportation exchanges
according to their niche strategies, as shown in Figure 2.1. Further, the working
mechanisms for price negotiations between shippers and carriers are described, along
with their price setting mechanisms and revenue models. Note that though some
exchanges may set the prices themselves based on prevailing market rates, to ensure that
all shippers' demands and all carriers' capacities are fulfilled with time, they do need to
incorporate either a shipper centric price setting mechanism, or a carrier centric price
setting mechanism, or both.
2.1.1 Strategic Categories of Operating Transportation Exchanges
For some time, shippers that wanted to consolidate their shipments and gain
efficiencies in their supply chain looked up to their 3PLs for advice. In return, 3PLs,
already managing information from their relationships with multiple shippers leveraged
their information base and relationships to make each of their shippers efficient with
respect to transportation costs and levels of service. As mentioned in section 1.1.2, Ryder
and Penske are examples of such traditional 3PLs, and will not be further described. The
expectation of a possible increase in efficiency arising out of the merger of two or more
3PLs led to Transplace.com, which resulted out of the merger of the logistics arms of J.B.
Hunt Transport, Covenant Transport, M.S. Carriers, Swift Transportation Co., U.S.
Xpress Enterprises, Inc., and Werner Enterprises, Inc. Information-based providers such
as 3plex.com provide 3PLs with Internet-based software to gain the benefits of
consolidating capacity without the legal and technical hassle of merging.
18
TYPE SUB GROUPS EXAMPLES
Third Party Traditional Ryder, Penske
Merging Transplace.com
Supporting 3plex.com
Transportation Industry Neutral Logistics.com,
Exchanges NTE
Industry Specific ShipChem.com
Equipment Specific CarrierPoint.com
Figure 2.1 Operating Transportation Exchanges2
During 2000, many industries have seen the advent of Internet based procurement
exchanges for their products. Likewise in transportation, exchanges such as NTE and
Logistics.com have emerged. These exchanges are neutral to all parties, allowing
shippers and carriers to have full control over their information, and to maintain their
brand recognition. In such an exchange, shippers and carriers retain the same amount of
bargaining power in negotiations that they would have if they were to negotiate one-on-
one with their counterparts outside the exchange. Some exchanges also offer to automate
and optimize demand with capacity, to manage all the freight - not just the spot market,
to add flexibility on who to select for each move, and the ability to create private or
tailored exchanges for all participants.
However, procurement and transportation exchanges are facing competition from
those that are uniquely designed to offer supply chain solutions for a specific industry.
ShipChem.com is an example of a company that is positioning itself as the virtual global
logistics provider for the chemical industry.
Another set of exchanges that is emerging concentrate on the management of
specific transportation equipment. This was the initial strategy behind CarrierPoint.com,
which focused on equipment for ocean transportation to start with.
20 Trading Exchanges in Transportation, Manrodt, K, Supplement to Logistics Management and
Distribution Report, September 2000
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Digital bulletin boards such as that provided by DAT Services are described in
section 1.2. They do not enable price negotiations between shippers and carriers, and thus
do not qualify as transportation exchanges.
2.1.2 Mechanisms of Operating Transportation Exchanges
This section discusses on the working mechanisms for price negotiations between
shippers and carriers, the revenue models, and the price setting mechanisms in some of
the operating transportation exchanges cited in section 2.1.1.
Transplace.com 2 1
Transplace.com includes an Internet-based service, free to shippers, that allows
them to post their shipments to solicit capacity at a "market rate" from a pre-qualified
group of carriers, which each shipper can specify. Member carriers review available
shipments and commit their capacities at spot prices for individual shipments. A shipper
accepts a carrier's capacity at the spot rate and tenders the freight to the carrier. The
transactions are conducted directly between shippers and carriers.
In Transplace.com, spot rates bid by carriers for loads form the basis of the
"market rates" that Transplace.com reveals to the shippers, indicating a carrier-centric
price setting mechanism. Its fees are not generated from the exchange but from other
services to its carrier members.
3plex.com 2 2
3plex.com is an Internet-based service for transactions between 3PLs and TL
carriers. 3PLs post their loads, offering prices for each of them. Carriers post their trucks
along with their desired origins and destinations for prospective loads. The web site
matches a 3PLs' load with a posted truck. The 3PLs' matching carrier is informed of the
prospective load along with the offered price. Upon the carrier's acceptance of the load,
3plex.com processes payment and communicates delivery information between the 3PL
and the carrier.
3Plex.com serves as an Application Service Provider (ASP), providing 3PLs with
the exchange applications they need to automate their spot market operations. 3plex.com
21 Source: http://www.transpilace.com (2000)
22 Source: http://w w w.3plex.com (2000)
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charges fees to its member 3PLs in order to generate revenues for itself. It is also possible
that 3plex.com charges a fee to carriers for every load they procure through the exchange.
However, the nature of the fees is not publicly available on their web site.
In 3plex.com, the prices offered by the 3PLs are used to transport loads. If a load
is not served by a carrier for a continued period of time the respective 3PL probably
increases the offered price for the load. Considering the 3PL as the shipper in the
exchange, the price setting mechanism in 3plex.com is shipper-centric.
Logistics.com 23
Logistics.com's primary software, OptiBid enables shippers to request bids using
one of its three components as appropriate. Further, it provides carriers with software that
enable them to bid competitively.
The first component allows shippers to bid out their entire networks for contracts.
It includes a forecasting tool which shippers use to estimate their expected loads on each
lane2 4 in their network during the period of the contract. In addition, it provides carriers
with combinatorial bidding tools that enable them to bid prices on optimal combinations
of lanes ensuring economies of scope in their operations. Currently, the network
component of OptiBid allows single round auctions only. Shippers using this component
pay fees to Logistics.com.
The second component of OptiBid allows shippers to bid out their individual
lanes for service contracts, which may be from weeks to months long. Carriers bid prices
for the shippers' lanes in addition to other attributes such as percent on-time delivery, and
capacity. A weighted index based on all the bid attributes including price, enable shippers
to compare between different carriers. The lane component allows carriers to revise their
bids. Shippers using this component pay fees to Logistics.com.
The third component allows shippers to bid out their daily loads in the spot
market. Biscayne auctions, which require each bidding carrier to submit its reservation
value, its starting bid price, and its desired margin above or below its competitors' bids, is
used. The exchange computes the carriers' final bids based on their criteria. The load
23 Source: http://www.logistics.com (2000)
24 An origin-destination pair between which loads are moved directly is referred to as a lane.
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component does not allow carriers to revise their bidding criteria. Shippers using this
component, and participating carriers not brought in by the shipper pay fees to
Logistics.com.
Each of the components requires carriers to bid prices, implying a carrier-centric
price setting mechanism. However, note each of the components present shippers with
the participating carriers' final bid prices or indices. A shipper uses its discretion in
choosing the winning carrier, which may not always be based on prices or indices only.
NTE2s
NTE has both shippers and TL carriers identify their available shipment or
capacity needs. The exchange collects shipment orders, and matches them to truck routes
provided by carriers. NTE recommends market prices to shippers based on prevailing
LTL rates for similar loads. When the delivery of the shipment is confirmed, NTE pays
the carrier and bills the shipper.
NTE's members include manufacturers, retailers, distributors, wholesalers, 3PLs
and various brokers. NTE has its fees built in to the load price, and thus generates
revenue from every transaction.
NTE may also have a carrier-centric price setting mechanism, or a shipper-centric
price setting mechanism, or both in place, to ensure a clearance mechanism for each load
and available capacity posted on the exchange.
Information on the auction mechanisms and revenue models adopted by
ShipChem.com and CarrierPoint.com is not publicly available. Thus, they are not
discussed here.
2.2 Auction Design Variables
As discussed in section 2.1, transportation exchanges enable shippers and carriers
to match loads with available capacity according to certain auction mechanisms. In such
procurement auctions, each shipper acts as the auctioneer for its loads, trying to procure
transportation for them, and carriers act as bidders, offering to provide transportation at
their bid prices.
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2 Source: http://www.nte.net (2000)
In transportation auctions, the term reservation value for a seller is the lowest bid
that it is willing to make, and that for a buyer is the highest bid that it is willing to accept.
Carriers compute their bid values based on their reservation values. A carrier's
reservation value is assumed to be composed of two components: operational costs and
location costs, which have been explained in section 1.1.4. It is in the interest of the
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shippers to encourage carriers to bid their true reservation values
The dimensions along which procurement auctions in a trucking exchange may be
differentiated are as follows.
2.2.1 Ascending and Descending Auction Mechanisms
In an ascending auction, the shipper sets a low bid price 27 to start the bidding
process. In successive rounds, the bid price is increased until any one carrier accepts the
load at the current bid price.
In a descending auction, the bid price is successively reduced until only a single
carrier remains, and the winning carrier wins the load at the final bid price. The auction
may proceed by the shipper calling out reduced bid prices or by the carriers calling out
reduced bid prices in consecutive rounds.
In both the auction mechanisms, if there is more than one carrier at the same bid
price, the shipper uses its discretion to choose between them.
NTE, which usually expect shippers and carriers to accept the "market prices"
suggested by them, possibly resort to the ascending auction mechanism to procure
transportation for loads that remain in the exchange for more than a certain period of
time. 3plex.com, which requires a shipper to offer a price for its load works as an
ascending auction, since the shipper needs to revise its offer price for the load if it
remains without being accepted by any carrier for a certain period of time. Button
auctions described in section 3.5, is an example of a descending auction.
2 Discussion on the computation of a shipper's reservation value is not within the scope of this thesis.
27 A low bid price refers to a price which is lower than the shipper's expectation of all the carriers'
reservation values
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Single and Multiple Round Auctions
In a single round auction, the carrier with the lowest bid price in the round wins
the load (or loads). In this type of auction, the carriers have little or no flexibility to
change their bids. Thus, the carriers are motivated to submit bids based on their
reservation values, unless they think they can win at higher prices.
In multiple round auctions, carriers are able to submit bids in successive rounds
based on their reservation values, the lowest bids in previous rounds, and the previous
round bids of the other carriers if known. A shipper decides on the last round at some
time during the negotiation process based on a threshold price that it targets, or based on
other bidding conditions, such as no changes in the carriers' bids for a certain number of
rounds.
Logistics.com provides single round auctions for contract negotiations of
shippers' networks and lanes, and spot market negotiations of their daily loads.
2.2.3 Open and Sealed Bid Auctions
In an open bid auction, each carrier has information about other carriers' bids in
previous rounds or auctions of similar loads. In this type of auction, carriers bid based on
their expectation of their competitors' bids estimated from the information they obtain
from previous rounds or auctions.
In a sealed bid auction, carriers have no information about other carriers' bids
except the lowest bid in a round. Thus, each carrier's bid in any round is based on their
reservation value and the lowest bids in previous rounds.
Open bid auctions have been discussed here for completeness. Internet based
transportation exchanges are all sealed bid auctions.
2.2.4 First and Second Price Auction Mechanisms
In a first price auction, the winning carrier wins the load at the final bid price. In a
sealed bid auction, this would mean that the winning carrier wins the load at the bid price
it quoted. It can be shown that in an open bid auction, it would mean that the winning
carrier wins the load at the reservation value of the lowest losing carrier assuming that
carriers wish to procure loads at prices higher than or equal to their reservation values.
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2.2.2
In a second price auction, the winning carrier would win the load at the bid price
of the lowest losing carrier. Though not yet popular in transportation auctions, this
auction mechanism would assure carriers of getting a fair price, despite bidding lower
than that would be required, for them to win the load. This-would encourage carriers to
bid their true reservation values.
It may be shown that the outcomes from a first price sealed bid auction and an
ascending auction are the same while, the outcomes from a second price sealed bid
auction and a descending auction are also the same 28. All transportation auctions
currently function according to first price auction mechanism only. Second price auction
mechanism is described here for completeness.
2.2.5 Sequential and Simultaneous Auctions
In auctions procuring transportation services for shippers' networks, a number of
lanes need to be negotiated. In this context, sequential auctions are auctions where each
lane is negotiated separately one after the other. Simultaneous auctions are auctions
where multiple lanes are auctioned at the same time. At present, Logistics.com is the only
transportation exchange that provides simultaneous auctions for contract negotiations.
2.2.6 Simple and Conditional Bidding Mechanisms
The major costs of logistics services involve the transportation of loads over a
network. Due to economies of scope, it is sometimes possible for carriers to offer a better
(lower) bid price when given a package of lanes instead of single lanes. In auctions with
simple bidding mechanism, each lane is negotiated separately. In simultaneous auctions,
bundling of lanes leads to better (lower) bid prices. This bidding process is referred to as
conditional bidding. At present, Logistics.com is the only transportation exchange that
enables conditional bidding mechanisms for contract negotiations.
28 Klemperer, P., "Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature", Journal of Economic Surveys, Volume 13,
No. 3, July 1999, pp. 227-286
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2.3 Characteristics of a Truck Exchange
Traditional markets consisting of a large number of buyers and sellers of each good
are characterized by perfect competition, meaning that each of the participants has no
influence on the prices of goods, acting as price takers. The prices at which supply and
demand of each good are equal is referred to as their market price, and is accepted by the
buyers and sellers of the good.
Markets where the number of buyers and/or sellers is small are characterized by
imperfect competition. In such markets, each buyer/seller participating in the market
choose price-quantity combinations that are most attractive to it. Moreover their
favorable price-quantity combinations depend on their expectation about their
competitors' choices.
This section describes the economic characteristics of trucking exchanges.
2.3.1 Imperfect Competition
As already mentioned, markets for goods in which the number of buyers and/or
sellers is small, are usually characterized by imperfect competition. In such markets,
which are referred to as auction markets, individual buyers and/or sellers are able to
influence the prices of the goods being auctioned.
In a trucking exchange, shippers attempt to procure transportation at prices less
than their reservation values, and carriers attempt to win loads at prices higher than their
reservation values. Shippers and carriers aim at maximizing their respective auction
profits by influencing the bid prices in the exchange, their profits being:
Shipper's auction profit = Shipper's reservation value minus Price at which transportation
is procured
Carrier's auction profit = Price at which transportation is provided minus Carrier's
reservation value
Thus, shippers attempt to procure transportation at the lowest costs possible, and carriers
attempt to win loads at the highest prices possible.
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Since the number of shippers procuring transportation for a load between a certain
origin and destination and the number of carriers bidding to provide transportation for
such a load at any point of time is small, each of them influences the price of transporting
the load. Hence, a trucking exchange is characterized by imperfect competition.
2.3.2 Incomplete Information
A market where competitors possess complete information about the costs and/or
profits of their competitors resulting from the various outcomes of a negotiation is rare.
Most exchanges are characterized by incomplete information where competitors possess
information only about their own costs.
In the context of trucking exchanges, even if it is assumed that the cost structures
of different carriers are similar, different network structures, equipment availabilities, and
customer bases of different carriers lead them to have different costs or reservation values
for transporting each load. Thus, no carrier is aware of its competitors' reservation
values.
2.3.3 Dynamic Nature
As in all exchanges, a carrier bids in a trucking exchange based on its reservation
value, and its perception about its competitors' bidding strategies. A carrier's auction
profit depends not only on its own bid, but on its competitors' bids as well. If a carrier
observes that its competitors' bidding strategies are different from what it perceived it to
be, the carrier changes its own bidding strategy in future auctions. Such alteration in
carriers' bidding strategies over time introduces a dynamic nature in trucking exchanges.
In addition to the usual dynamic nature of exchanges, carriers' changing
equipment availabilities and demands at various locations in their networks over time
introduce another dimension of dynamism in the carriers' bidding strategies in an
exchange. A carrier's acceptance of a load leads to additional equipment at the
destination location and less equipment at the origin location of the load, resulting in
changes in the carrier's location costs. In turn, these lead to revised reservation values for
the transportation of future loads over the carrier's network, and subsequent alteration of
its bidding strategy due to changes in its profits from the various outcomes of an auction.
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2.4 Summary of Chapter
In trucking exchanges, shippers act as auctioneers participating in procurement
auctions, and carriers bid on the shippers' loads wishing to provide transportation for
them. Shippers may choose from different procurement auctions to minimize their
transportation costs by encouraging carriers to bid their true reservation values. Carriers
bid in the auctions to maximize their expected profits. Trucking exchanges are
characterized by imperfect competition, incomplete information, and dynamism. These
characteristics motivate the use of game theory to model the research problem that is
addressed in this thesis.
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CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH PROBLEM
This chapter describes the research problem and discusses the methodology used
to address it. Section 3.1 describes the specific issue in truck exchanges that is addressed
in this thesis. Section 3.2 models the problem within the framework of game theory.
Section 3.3 discusses the assumptions that are made in solving for single round sealed bid
auctions and button auctions, discussed in sections 3.4 and 3.5 respectively. The chapter
is summarized in section 3.6.
3.1 Problem Statement
Internet-based trucking exchanges with carrier-centric price setting mechanisms
such as Transplace.com and Logistics.com may be depicted as in Figure 3.1. As briefly
described in section 1.2, the order of actions taken by shippers and carriers in such a
trucking exchange is as follows.
Demand pull
1. Shippers form load
packages, and request
for bids
2. Carriers compute costs
for loads, and bid
3. Shippers compare carriers'
bids, and allocate loads
4. Carriers assign trucks
and equipment
Truck exchange for shipper-carrier
negotiations
Supply
Figure 3.1 Structure of a Truck Exchange
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1. Posting of loads: A shipper posts its load on the truck exchange, and requests for bids
from several carriers.
2. Bidding: Carriers bid on the posted load on the basis of their expected operational
costs for moving the load, current location costs for the origin and destination
locations of the load, and other strategic factors such as their perception about their
competitors' bidding strategies.
3. Evaluation of Bids: The shipper compares carriers' bids and allocates its load to the
winning carrier. Shippers may have different criteria for comparison of bids. For
example, in addition to bid prices offered by the carriers, they may compare carriers'
service reliability.
4. Assignment of trucks: The winning carriers assign their equipment and crew to
shippers' loads. After delivery confirmation, payment is processed between the
shipper and carrier.
This thesis focuses on the 2 step in Figure 3.1, that is, a carriers' strategy for
bidding on a posted load. A carrier's operational costs and location costs corresponding
to a load determine its reservation value for the load. Carriers bid on loads based on their
reservation values, and their perceptions about their competitors' bidding strategies.
The mechanism according to which carriers bid based on their perception about
their competitors' bidding strategies is often subjective. This thesis attempts to develop a
theoretical model for carriers' bidding strategies that they could use to automate their
bidding. Further, the model is also intended to help shippers in adopting appropriate
auction mechanisms to procure transportation.
3.2 Game Theoretic Model
A game is a formal representation of a situation in which a number of individuals
interact in a sense of strategic interdependence, meaning that each individual's welfare
depends not only on its own actions, but also on the actions of the other individuals29
Thus, the actions that are best for an individual to take may depend on what it expects the
other individuals to do.
29 Basic Elements of Non-cooperative Games, Mas-Colell, A., Whinston, M.D., and Green, J.R.,
Microeconomic Theory, pp. 219, 1995
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The characteristics of imperfect competition, incomplete information, and
dynamism motivate the application of game theory to the problem. This section
represents the strategic competition among carriers to win a load within a game theoretic
framework.
3.2.1 Components of the Game
Four things need to be identified to describe a game. They are as follows.
1. The players are the individuals participating in the game. In a trucking exchange with
a carrier-centric price setting mechanism, the carriers are the players.
2. The rules describe the way the game is played including the possible actions by the
players. In auctions, the specific auction design sets the rules of the game.
3. The outcomes denote the result of the game for each possible set of actions by the
players. In trucking exchanges, the outcomes indicate the winning and losing carriers
for each possible set of bids.
4. The payoffs denote the players' profits corresponding to the possible outcomes. In the
context of the problem addressed, the carriers' auction profits are their payoffs.
3.2.2 Best Response Bidding Strategy
A central concept of game theory is the notion of a player's strategy. A strategy is
a complete contingent plan, or a set of decision rules, that specifies how the player will
act in every possible circumstance.
In a game representing strategic competition among carriers to win a load, a
player's strategy is the way that a carrier bids on a load. Among the different bidding
strategies that a carrier may adopt, those that maximize its expected profits if its
conjecture about its competitors' bidding strategies were true are its best response
bidding strategies.
3.2.3 Equilibrium Bidding Strategy
The most widely used solution concept in applications of game theory to
economics is the Nash equilibrium. In a Nash equilibrium, each player's strategy choice
30 Non-cooperative Games, Nash, J.F., Annals of Mathematics 54: 289-95, 1951
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is a best response to the strategies actually played by its rivals. Thus, in a Nash
equilibrium, none of the players have any incentive to unilaterally deviate from their
current strategies. Players' strategies corresponding to a Nash equilibrium are referred to
as the players' equilibrium strategies.
In the problem addressed in this thesis, a Nash equilibrium exists when each
carrier's bidding strategy is a best response to the strategies actually adopted by its
competitors. Thus, in a Nash equilibrium none of the carriers will have any incentive to
unilaterally deviate from their current bidding strategy. The carriers' strategies
corresponding to a Nash equilibrium are their equilibrium bidding strategies.
3.2.4 Shipper and Carrier Efficiencies
The Italian economist, Vilfred Pareto provides a precise definition for the concept
of economic efficiency, which was first enunciated by Adam Smith as the existence of an
"invisible hand" that helps allocate resources efficiently in properly functioning markets.
Pareto defines an allocation of resources to be efficient if it is not possible (through
further reallocations) to make one person better off without making someone else worse
off. 3 ' In the context of transportation procurement auctions, the concept of efficiency is
addressed from two perspectives in this thesis: carriers' efficiency in an auction, and a
shipper's efficiency in procuring transportation.
An outcome of an auction is defined to be efficient if it maximizes the carriers'
aggregate profits. Thus, the efficiency of any outcome is defined as the ratio of the
carriers' aggregate profits from the outcome to the carriers' aggregate profits from an
efficient outcome.
From the shippers' perspective, an auction is defined to be efficient if it
minimizes its transportation costs for moving a load. Thus, the efficiency of any auction
is defined as the ratio of the shipper's transportation costs from the auction to its
transportation costs from an efficient auction. It is assumed that a shipper's transportation
costs from an auction is equal to the winning bid corresponding to an efficient outcome
of the auction.
31 Source: Microeconomic Theory: Basic Principles and Extensions, Nicholson, W., 1998
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3.2.5 Summary
To summarize, the strategic competition among carriers in an auction is modeled
as a game. The best response strategies of the players in the game form the basis of
carriers' best response bidding strategies in a procurement auction. Each carrier bids
according to its best response bidding strategy expecting its competitors' to bid according
to certain bidding strategies. A Nash equilibrium exists when each of the carriers bid
according to their best response bidding strategies, and none of them has the incentive to
change its bidding strategy unilaterally. If there are several Nash equilibria in an auction,
one that maximizes the aggregate profits of all carriers is defined as the efficient Nash
equilibrium. Among the auctions considered, one that minimizes the shipper's
transportation costs is defined as an efficient auction from the shipper's perspective.
3.3 Assumptions
This thesis applies the game theoretic model discussed in section 3.2, to two types
of procurement auctions: single round sealed bid auctions with first price mechanism, and
button auctions. These auctions are described in detail in sections 3.4 and 3.5
respectively. This section discusses two assumptions that have been made to simplify the
game theoretic solutions to the mentioned auctions.
3.3.1 Myopic Strategy
As discussed earlier, a carrier bids for loads based on its reservation value for the
load and its perception of its competitors' bidding strategies from previous auctions.
Further, if a carrier observes that its competitors' bidding strategies are different from
what it perceived it to be, the carrier alters its own bidding strategy in future auctions
which affects all the carriers' profits in the future auctions.
The game theoretic model implies that a carrier bids in an auction according to its
best response bidding strategy so as to maximize its profits. Since carriers participate in
auctions of similar loads over time and their current bidding strategies affect their profits
in the future auctions, a carrier's best response bidding strategy can mean to maximize
the carrier's aggregate profits in a number of similar auctions taken together. To simplify
the game theoretic solution to each of the auctions considered, each carrier is assumed to
devise its best response bidding strategy maximizing its profits in the current auction
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only. The impact of the carriers' current bidding strategies on their profits in future
auctions is not considered.
3.3.2 Constant Reservation Value
As discussed in section 2.3.3, each carrier's reservation value changes with
changing equipment availabilities and demands at various locations in its network over
time. Changes in carriers' reservation values lead to changes in their bidding strategies.
To simplify the solution to each of the auctions considered, each carrier's reservation
value corresponding to a load is assumed to remain constant over time.
3.4 Single Round Sealed Bid Auction with First Price Mechanism
This section discusses the game theoretic solution to a single round sealed bid
auction with a first price mechanism consisting of 3 or more bidding carriers. A single
load is considered in each auction. Each auction consists of carriers bidding for the load
only once. The carrier bidding the lowest price is considered to win the load at its own
bid price. After each auction, the lowest or winning bid is revealed to all the competing
carriers.
A learning function is formulated to represent each carrier's updating of its
perceptions/beliefs about its competitors' bids. Each carrier's best response bidding
strategy based on its reservation value, and its belief about its competitors' bids is
formulated. Consecutive single round auctions of similar loads are simulated to identify
the Nash equilibria. Only one Nash equilibrium is identified, which is thus considered to
be efficient. Corresponding to the Nash equilibrium, the carriers' aggregate profit is
computed to quantify the carriers' and shipper's efficiency.
Some of the notations used to represent the game theoretic model are as follows:
Consecutive auctions are denoted by t = 1,.., ,...,T;
Competing carriers are denoted by i = 1,.., N;
Carrier i's reservation value for the load in auction t = ris denoted by v,, = vi;
Carrier i's bid in auction t = iris denoted by b .;
Bids of all carriers in auction t = ris denoted by { bi }
Bids of all carriers other than i till auction t = r-J is denoted by Bi,;
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3.4.1 Beliefs
Each carrier's belief about its competitors' bids is based on the lowest bids in
previous auctions. At any time, each carrier's belief is represented by a uniform
distribution with an upper bound and a lower bound. The choice of a uniform distribution
means that within the range of probable bid values that a carrier believes its competitors
to bid from, it has no reason to believe that they are more likely to bid some values as
compared to others in the range. Thus, carrier i's belief about its competitors' bids in
auction ris represented by the uniform distribution function u(B" ", B"). B"x and
B"" denote the upper and lower bounds of the range of bid values within which the
carrier expects it competitors to bid. To simplify notations, the probability density
function corresponding to the uniform distribution function u(B"m, B"m2), and
representing a carrier's beliefs about its competitors' bids is represented by f j,(x), and
the corresponding cumulative probability density function is represented by F1 (x) in
the rest of this thesis. The following results are computed based on the properties of a
uniform distribution function:
f_ (x) - Bmax (1)
B - Bi
x - B "
--> F _ (x ) ; (2 )B_~ -i_
= Pr ob(x B_) = 0;Vx> B"
B""* -x .
= ~ ;VB"""n < x<&B"" ;
B""* -B"~n ~
=1;Vx < B"m" (3)
After every auction when the lowest bid is revealed, each carrier learns more
about its competitors' bidding strategies and updates its beliefs, based on which it bids in
future auctions of similar loads. An exponential learning function representing the
process of each carrier's updating the parameters representing its beliefs, B"j and B" nis
formulated as follows.
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At auction t = 1, each carrier assumes a range r and sets:
Bmi =v. -r./2; and
B"" =v. + r, / 2 (4)
After auction t = r-1, each carrier updates:
in = (1- a)B""_ + amin{bii} ; and (5)
B"; = (1-a)B"7_ +camin{bi};if bT <min{b. 1 }
= min{br-1 } - 8; otherwise (6)
where,
a denotes the rate of learning, and
#idenotes the accuracy of estimating the upper bound
Thus, the upper and lower bounds of the uniform probability distribution functions
representing each carrier's beliefs about its competitors' bids are updated based on the
lowest bid that is revealed after every auction.
3.4.2 Objective Function
In every auction, each carrier bids to maximize its profits. To make profits in an
auction, a carrier needs to win it by bidding the lowest price. At the time of bidding, a
carrier only possesses beliefs about its competitors' bids. Bidding a low value implies
good chances of a carrier's winning the auction but yields low profits, and bidding a high
value implies low chances of a carrier's winning the auction but yields high profits if it
does. Thus, each carrier bids x in an auction maximizing its expected profits which is
represented by:
E(x) = [Pr ob(x < B_,,)][x - vi,] (7)
Assuming B"2" 5 x B,M
B""X -x
=> E(x) = [X -~' ][x - ve] (8)
B""* -i"*
Applying the first order conditions for maximization to (8)
aE B"x + vi
->-=>x= 2(9)
ax 2
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Applying the second order conditions for maximization to (8)
a 2 E -2
< 0 => x is a global maximum (10)
ax2  B"x -B"m
Thus from (9) and (10),
If B"",n <x<&B"Qx, b == i~ (11)2
Bidding a value equal to the lower bound of the range of values within which a carrier's
competitors are expected to bid yields at least the same amount of expected profit for the
carrier as bidding a value lower than that yields. Thus,
If x < B" r, b. = B" ,r (12)
When the bid value implied by (9) is greater than the upper bound of the range of values
within which a carrier's competitors are expected to bid, it can be shown that the carrier's
reservation value corresponding to the load is greater than the upper bound. This means
that the carrier expects to lose the auction if it bids any value equal or greater than its
reservation value. In such a situation, a carrier refrains from participating in the auction,
which may be represented as follows:
If x > B"a , b1e =v, (13)
Hence, the rules implied by (11), (12), and (13) constitute a carrier's best response
bidding strategy. To identify the carriers' equilibria bidding strategies, consecutive single
round auctions of similar loads are simulated. Carriers bid according to the above
strategies in each auction, updating the parameters representing their beliefs after each
auction. The results of the simulation are presented in section 4.1. Note that the rules
derived in this section are based on the assumption that each carriers' beliefs about its
competitors' bids can be represented by a uniform distribution.
3.5 Button Auctions
Button auctions have not yet gained popularity in Internet-based trucking
exchanges, or other transportation exchanges. It is considered here due to its increasing
popularity in Internet-based auctions.
A button auction literally consists of bidders placing their hands on a button.
Similar to a descending auction, the bid price is reduced over time by an automated
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system administered by the auctioneer. At different bid prices, different bidders lift their
hands from their buttons to indicate that they are not willing to participate in the auction
at or below the running bid price. Once a bidder lifts its hands from its button, it is not
allowed to re-enter the current auction. Further, the auction'stops when only one bidder
remains. In a transportation procurement auction administered as a button auction, the
buttons would be in the control of the carriers while the shippers would administer the
auctions.
At bid prices greater than a carrier's reservation value for the load being
auctioned, the carrier retains a chance of making a profit by winning the load, and thus
continues to participate in the auction by keeping its hands on the button. At bid prices
less than the carrier's reservation value for the load, the carrier incurs a loss if it wins the
load. Hence in a button auction, a carrier's best response bidding strategy is to continue
to participate in the auction of the load until the running bid price drops below its
reservation value. Thus in a button auction, the only possible outcome is the carrier with
the lowest reservation value winning the load at the reservation value of the second but
last carrier to drop out of the auction. Since there is only one possible outcome in a button
auction, it is also the Nash equilibrium. Carriers' aggregate profits are computed to
quantify the carriers' and shipper's efficiency.
It is observed from the discussions in sections 3.4 and 3.5 that in button auctions,
carriers bid irrespective of their beliefs about their competitors' bidding strategies, while
in single round sealed bid auctions with a first price mechanism, carriers bid based on
their beliefs about their competitors' bidding strategies.
3.6 Summary of Chapter
In trucking exchanges, carriers bid on shipper's loads. A carrier bids a value
based on its reservation value for moving the load, and its perception of its competitors'
bidding strategies. Following certain assumptions, a game theoretic model is formulated
to recommend carriers' best response bidding strategies in single round sealed bid
auctions with a first price mechanism, and button auctions. The solutions to the model
also facilitate the identification of auctions that minimize a shipper's transportation costs.
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Such solutions may provide a framework for the design of future software programs that
help shippers and carriers to participate in Internet-based trucking exchanges.
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CHAPTER 4 RESULTS AND CONCLUSION
Currently operating transportation exchanges such as Transplace.com and
Logistics.com enable shippers to bid out their loads in spot markets through sealed bid
auctions. Auctions provided by Transplace.com consist of a single round, while those
provided by Logistics.com consist of multiple rounds conducted by the automated agents
used in that auction. Winning carriers are identified by exchanges based on a first price
mechanism. Though button auctions are not yet used in transportation exchanges, they
have gained popularity in Internet-based auctions. This chapter demonstrates the
solutions to the game theoretic model presented in Chapter 3, followed by a conclusion to
this thesis. Section 4.1 presents simulations performed to evaluate single round sealed bid
auctions with first price mechanism, and button auctions. Section 4.2 discusses the
significance of this research to Internet-based trucking exchanges. Possible extensions of
this research are summarized in section 4.3, followed by a concluding summary of this
thesis.
4.1 Experiments and Results
Consecutive auctions of similar loads, each procuring transportation services for a
single load are simulated. This section presents trends in carriers' bids and beliefs in
single round sealed bid auctions with first price mechanism. Two cases are considered: a
duopoly with 2 carriers, and an oligopoly with 3 carriers bidding in each auction. In each
of the cases, each carrier bids according to the best response bidding strategies suggested
by the solution to the game theoretic model in section 3.4. Carriers' equilibria bidding
strategies are identified from the results of the simulations. Further, their aggregate
profits in the duopoly and oligopoly are compared with that in a button auction and a
monopoly situation, to evaluate the carriers' and shippers' efficiencies in each of the
auctions.
4.1.1 Duopoly
Single round sealed bid auctions with first price mechanism are simulated. The
reservation values for the two carriers bidding for a shipper's load in each auction are
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Figure 4.1 Trend of Bids in a Single Round Sealed Bid Auction with a First Price Mechanism having 2 Carriers (Duopoly)
with Reservation Values, v, = 100, and v2 = 150
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Figure 4.2 Trend of Beliefs in a Single Round Sealed Bid Auction with a First Price Mechanism having 2 Carriers (Duopoly)
with Reservation Values, v, = 100, and v2 = 150
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arbitrarily chosen to be 100 and 150, which represent the dollar values below which each
of the respective carriers is not willing to accept the load.
According to the rules of a single round auction each carrier bids in an auction
only once. Each carrier bids the highest value that is lower than what it expects to be its
competitor's bid value. In each auction, the shipper assigns its load to the lowest bidding
carrier, as implied by a first price mechanism. Each carrier begins participating in the
consecutive auctions with the belief that their competitor will bid a value equal to their
own reservation value. After each auction, the carriers update their beliefs about their
competitor's bid based on the lowest bid that is revealed, using the learning function (6)
formulated in section 3.4.1. The parameter ais chosen to be 0.4 to represent steady
updating of beliefs. The parameter $6is chosen to be 1 to represent that carriers will be
indifferent towards making an extra profit of less than $1. The carriers' bids and beliefs
in the consecutive auctions are presented in figures 4.1 and 4.2 respectively.
Bid Trends
Figure 4.1 shows each carrier's bids in the consecutive auctions. Carrier 1 with a
reservation value of 100 begins by bidding 100, whereas Carrier 2 begins by bidding 150.
Through consecutive auctions, Carrier 1 increases its bid to 149, whereas Carrier 2
continues to bid 150, being unable to bid below its reservation value for the load.
After the 1 5th auction, the carriers do not change their bids unilaterally, indicating
that a Nash equilibrium has been reached. Note that the value of a influences the
number of auctions that carriers take to reach their equilibria bidding strategies. With a
small value of a , carriers take a large number of auctions to reach their equilibria
bidding strategies, and vice-versa. Since only one equilibrium exists in the duopoly, it is
also efficient.
Trend of Beliefs
Figure 4.2 shows each carrier's beliefs about its competitor's bids at the
beginning of each auction. Before the Is' auction, Carrier 1 expects its competitor to bid
100, whereas Carrier 2 expects its competitor to bid 150. After the 1s' auction, Carrier 2
updates its belief about its competitor's bid based on the lowest bid of 100. After each of
the following auctions, each carrier updates its beliefs about its competitor's bid
according to learning function (6), formulated in section 3.4.1.
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Since Carrier 2 always bids 150, Carrier l's learning curve representing its beliefs
about its competitor's bids is linear. However since Carrier 1 increases its bid linearly
from 100 to 149 during the 15 auctions, Carrier 2's learning curve is exponential in
nature following the drop after the l't auction.
4.1.2 Oligopoly
Single round sealed bid auctions with first price mechanism are simulated with
the same 3 carriers bidding in each. The carriers' reservation values are arbitrarily chosen
to be 100, 125, and 150, which represent the dollar values below which each of the
respective carriers are not willing to accept the load. Each carrier bids according to its
best response bidding strategy, formulated in section 3.4.2. Each carrier begins
participating in the consecutive auctions with the beliefs implied by equation (4) in
section 3.4.1. The initial range ri representing the range around their own reservation
values that each carrier expects its competitors to bid is chosen arbitrarily to be 40 for all
the carriers. After each auction, the carriers update their beliefs about their competitor's
bid based on the lowest bid that is revealed, using the learning functions (5) and (6)
presented in section 3.4.1. As explained in the case of a duopoly, the parameter ais
chosen to be 0.4 to represent steady updating of beliefs, and the parameter f3is chosen to
be 1, assuming that the carriers will be indifferent towards making an extra profit of less
than $1. The carriers' bids and beliefs in the consecutive auctions are presented in figures
4.3 and 4.4 respectively.
Bid Trends
Figure 4.3 shows each carrier's bids in the consecutive auctions. In the first
auction, the three carriers with reservation values 100, 150, and 125 bid 110, 135, and
160 respectively, as suggested by their initial beliefs and their best response bidding
strategies. Through consecutive auctions, Carrier 1 increases its bid to 124, whereas
Carrier 2 and Carrier 3 bid their reservation values of 150 and 125, after losing in the 1"
auction.
After the 8th auction, none of the carriers change their bids unilaterally, indicating
that a Nash equilibrium has been reached. As mentioned in the case of duopoly, the value
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Figure 4.3 Trend of Bids in a Single Round Sealed Bid Auction with a First Price Mechanism having 3 Carriers (Oligopoly)
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of a influences the number of auctions taken by the carriers to reach their equilibria
bidding strategies. Since only one equilibrium exists in the oligopoly, it is also efficient.
Trend of Beliefs
Before each auction, each carrier expects its competitors' bids to be distributed
according to a uniform distribution with a range r around its own reservation value.
Thus, before the 1St auction the parameters of the uniform distributions representing the
carriers' beliefs are: 80 and 120 for Carrier 1, 130 and 170 for Carrier 2, and 105 and 145
for Carrier 3. After each auction, the carriers update their beliefs about their competitors'
bids, based on the lowest bid in the auction. Figure 4.4 shows the upper and lower bounds
representing the carriers' beliefs in each auction. The upper and lower bounds
representing Carrier 2 and Carrier 3's beliefs about their competitors' bids converge
exponentially to 123.5 and 124.5, around the lowest bid of 124 in the consecutive
auctions. Though the lower bound representing Carrier l's beliefs converges
exponentially to 124, the upper bound continues to increase linearly.
4.1.3 Summary of Results
Carriers' aggregate profits in the duopoly and oligopoly are compared with those
in a button auction and a monopoly situation, to infer about the carriers' and shippers'
efficiencies in the different situations. The carriers participating in the button auction are
the same three carriers participating in the oligopoly. Each continues participating in each
auction till the running bid price is less than its reservation value, resulting in Carrier 1
winning the load at a bid price of 124. Thus, the carriers' bidding strategies are
independent of their competitors' bids. The shipper's highest acceptable bid is chosen
arbitrarily to be 170, higher than the reservation value of all the 3 carriers. Thus in a
monopoly situation with Carrier 1 as the only carrier in the marketplace, Carrier I moves
the load at a price of 170.
Figure 4.5 shows that the equilibrium profit in a monopoly situation is higher than
that in a duopoly, which is in turn higher than that in an oligopoly situation. Further in the
oligopoly situation, carriers' aggregate profits increase to 24 in single round sealed bid
auctions with a first price mechanism, whereas it is always 24 in button auctions. This
implies that from the carriers' perspective, button auctions are more efficient than single
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Figure 4.5 Comparison of carriers' aggregate profits in a single round sealed bid auction with first price mechanism (duopoly
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round sealed bid auctions with a first price mechanism. However from the shippers'
perspective, the reverse is true. The value of the parameter in the learning function, a
influences the number of auctions taken for the carriers' aggregate profits to increase to
24 in the single round sealed bid auctions. A high value for a implies that the number of
auctions taken would be small, and vice-versa.
Figures 4.1-4.4 representing single round sealed bid auctions with first price
mechanism with 2 and 3 carriers, show carriers updating their beliefs about their
competitors' bids, and bidding according to their best response bidding strategy in the
consecutive auctions. Increasing the value of the parameter a reduces the number of
auctions before which the carriers reach their equilibria bidding strategies, but makes the
carriers sensitive to erroneous bidding by their competitors. Figure 4.5 comparing the
carriers' aggregate profits from different auctions, suggests that compared to single round
sealed bid auctions with first price mechanism, button auctions are more efficient for
carriers and less efficient for shippers in the short-run, and after a certain number of
auctions are equally efficient for both. The number of auctions after which button
auctions and single round sealed bid auctions are equally efficient for shippers and
carriers is influenced by the value of the parameter a.
4.2 Contribution
This research was motivated by the increase in the number of Internet-based
trucking exchanges that have come into existence during 2000. This thesis categorizes
currently operating transportation exchanges according to their price setting mechanisms
and niche strategies. Transportation exchanges either have a carrier-centric price setting
mechanism, a shipper-centric price setting mechanism, or both. Further, they are
categorized according to their niche strategies. 3PLs and their consortiums providing
services similar to transportation exchanges are described. Further, general and
specialized transportation exchanges serving all and specific shippers and carriers, are
described.
A trucking exchange with a carrier-centric price setting mechanism is considered
in this thesis. A game theoretic model is formulated to represent the analytical basis of
carriers' -bidding strategies in trucking exchanges. Carriers' reservation values are
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composed of their operational costs, and location costs that represent their strategic cost
of moving a truck from one location to another in their network. Carriers bid based on
their reservation values and their beliefs about their competitors' bidding strategies.
Carriers are considered to participate in auctions of similar roads over time. Through the
auctions, they update their beliefs about their competitors' bidding strategies using an
exponential learning function that is formulated. Solution to the game theoretic model for
single round sealed bid auctions with first price mechanism recommends carriers'
optimal bidding strategies.
Simulations are performed to represent auctions of similar loads over time.
Following certain assumptions, carriers' bids in single round sealed bid auctions are
observed to reach equilibrium states. Carriers' aggregate profits in single round sealed
bid auctions with first price mechanism, button auctions, and a monopoly situation are
compared. In the short-run, button auctions are observed to be more profitable for carriers
compared to single round sealed bid auctions with first price mechanism, also implying
that shippers' transportation costs are lower in single round sealed bid auctions with first
price mechanism than in button auctions. The carriers' rates of learning about their
competitors' bidding strategies influence the number of auctions after which first price
sealed bid auctions become as efficient as button auctions for both, shippers and carriers.
4.3 Extensions
Carriers' location costs vary with time based on their changing equipment
demand and availabilities at different locations in their networks. Moreover, their
operational costs also vary with time. Together, these lead carriers' reservation values to
vary with time. To simplify the solutions to the game theoretic model formulated in this
thesis, carriers' reservation values were assumed to be constant over time. Research may
be performed to solve the game theoretic models for varying reservation values.
Carriers participate in auctions of similar loads. Their current bids affect their
competitors' bids in future auctions, which in turn affect their profits in those. The
carriers' optimal bidding strategies developed in this thesis assume carriers to be myopic
32 Location costs capture the economies of scope that exist in TL operations. By including a carrier's
location costs in its reservation values, this thesis treats carriers as sellers of any good or service.
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with respect to their profits, i.e., they are assumed to bid to maximize their profits in the
current auction only. Research may be performed to formulate and solve game theoretic
models representing carriers' bidding strategies for long-term profit maximization.
In this thesis, models were developed to represent carriers' bidding strategies for a
single load. In reality, carriers bid for different loads over time. Research may be
performed to develop carriers' bidding strategies in such cases.
In this thesis, single round sealed bid auctions with first price mechanism and
button auctions were modeled within the framework of game theory. Research may be
performed to model other auctions such as single round sealed bid auctions with second
price mechanism, ascending auctions, and simultaneous auctions of multiple loads
allowing conditional bidding within a game theoretic framework to determine their
efficiencies with respect to shippers and carriers.
The methodologies developed in this thesis and the suggested extensions may be
implemented as software programs for shippers and carriers. Shippers may use the
software programs to bid out their loads in spot markets. Carriers may use the software
programs to bid for shippers' loads. Using current technology like CORBA , such
programs may be enabled to interact with each other automatically through the Internet,
further reducing human interaction in trucking exchanges.
3 CORBA is an acronym for Common Object Request Broker Architecture
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